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BRIAN R. BINGER*, ROBERT COPPLE**,
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN***
Contingent Valuation Methodology in
the Natural Resource Damage
Regulatory Process: Choice Theory
and the Embedding Phenomenon
ABSTRACT
In their most recent article on the use of Contingent Valuation
Methodology ("CVM") in the natural resource damages assessment
("NRDA") process, the authors take issue with the CVM compo-
nents of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
("NOAA") proposed NRDA rules. In particular, the authors argue
that NOAA's proposed NRDA process does not comport with basic
tenets of choice theory and that the CVM safeguards created by
NOAA are not adequate to address the inherent, and perhaps
irreconcilable, flaws in CVM assessments. To illustrate their
arguments, the authors examine and criticize NOAA's treatment
and general disregard of the embedding phenomenon. The author's
argue that the existence of the embedding phenomenon in CVM
valuations demonstrates the inappropriateness of CVM as a
regulatory tool in the NRDA process.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of Contingent Valuation Methodology ("CVM") to
quantify natural resource damages claims under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Oil Pollution
Compensation and Act of 1990 ("OPA")2 has engendered a storm of
* Adjunct Associate Professor of Economics, Iowa State University. B.A., St. Olaf College,
1974; Ph.D., California Institute of Technology, 1979,** Environmental Attorney, Parcel,
Mauro, Hultin, & Spaanstra, P.C., Denver, Colorado. B.A., University of Nebraska, 1977, J.D.,
1981, M.A., 1985; Ph.D., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1990,*** Dean,
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and Professor of Economics, Iowa State University.
B.A., Smith College, 1968; M.A., 1969, University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D., 1972; Ph.D.,
California Institute of Technology, 1979.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). CERCLA, § 9607(a)(4)(C), creates a cause
of action for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release [of hazardous substances] .... "
2. 33 U.S.C. § § 2701-2761 (Supp. 1993). Similar to CERCLA § 9607(a)(4)(C), OPA §
2702(b)(2) creates a cause of action for natural resource damages resulting from a discharge
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regulatory debate,3 perhaps more intense than has previously been
directed at any social science or economic method in any legal context.
The complexity of the debate is evidenced by the collection of articles
published in the 1994 Natural Resources Journal CVM Symposium. As
demonstrated by the Symposium, economic and legal experts in the field
embrace widely divergent opinions regarding whether CVM is a highly
insightful, innovative technique that allows for the quantification of
previously unquantifiable public natural resource non-use values or,
instead, is an economic and social science aberration, lacking reliability,
trustworthiness, and a theoretically defensible foundation, which is good
for little more than creating inflated damage claims intended for
leveraging disproportionate settlements.5
Professors Ronald G. Cummings and Glenn W. Harrison, experts
in the use and misuse of CVM, describe both the method and the
problem in a more evenhanded fashion in their Symposium article, as
follows:
The CVM involves the use of surveys describing the good or
resource injury to be valued, a rule that relates financial
payments to the provision of the good or the avoidance of the
injury, and a question that asks the subject to report a maxi-
mum willingness to pay (WTP) some amount of money to see
the good provided or the injury avoided. Both the "good" and
the subject's payment are hypothetical. These features of the
CVM, particularly hypothetical payment, are the source of
concern over the extent to which values derived using this
method actually reflect real economic commitments in any
precise way.6
CVM has been criticized, as embodying a number of fatal flaws,
including inherent strategic and behavioral biases, inappropriate and
skewed survey methods and analyses, and informational and sensitivity
inadequacies.7 While the authors believe these concerns are real and
of oil "into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic
zone.... Id. § 2702(a).
3. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the CVM debate, see Brian R.
Binger, Robert F. Copple, and Elizabeth Hoffman, The Use of Contingent Valuation
Methodology in Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 NW.
L. R. 1029 (1995), passim. For a discussion of how CVM-based valuations are then used to
calculate natural resources damage claims, see Robert F. Copple, The New Economic Efficiency
in Natural Resource Damage Assessment, U. Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995).
4. Symposium, Estimating CERCLA Damages, 34 Nat. Resources J. 1 (Winter 1994).
5. See generally, Binger, Copple, & Hoffman, supra note 3.
6. Ronald G. Cummings & Glenn W. Harrison, Was the Ohio Court Well Informed in its
Assessment of the Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method?, 34 Nat. Resources J. 1, 2 (1994).
7. For a sampling of the more significant CVM literature, see generally, id.; Contingent
[Vol. 35
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHODOLOGY
serious, even correcting for these flaws-a task that may very well be
impossible--CVM suffers from a more serious and fundamental flaw in
that the method does not elicit willingness-to-pay ("WTP") bids that are
consistent with the tenets of choice theory. As such, CVM is incapable of
producing results that are sufficiently trustworthy to support natural
resource damage claims or judgments. Further, it is highly unlikely that
any amount of methodological refinement will provide a fix for those
flaws and allow for the actual capture of real and accurate natural
resource values.
While the choice theory issues raised by CVM are numerous and
varied, the authors assert that the failure of CVM to comport with tenets
of choice theory can be demonstrated by focusing on the "embedding
phenomenon" inherent in CVM assessments.' The embedding phenome-
non is a psychological survey effect whereby, when respondents are
asked to value or state their ("WTP") for a target commodity, i.e., the
continued existence of the whooping crane, WTP valuations will vary
significantly depending on whether respondents are asked to value the
target good alone or as a subset of other public goods i.e., all public
environmental goods, all wildlife, whooping cranes. Such discrepancy
between bids for the target good because of the bundling of the target
good with other public goods is inconsistent with choice theory, under
which the valuation of the target good should remain constant regardless
of whether it is presented as a subset of, or bundled with, other
environmental goods.9
Valuation: A Critical Assessment (Jerry A. Hausman, ed., 1993) (hereinafter Hausman):Ronald
G. Cummings, et al., Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation
Method (1986); Robert C. Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public
Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method (1989); The New Rules for Natural Resource
Damage Assessments and Claims Under CERCLA and OPA 480-617 (Linda Burlington &
William S. Roush, Jr. eds.,1994); Valuing Natural Assets: The Economics of Natural Resource
Damage Assessment (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 1993); Kevin M. Ward &
John W. Duffield, Natural Resource Damages: Law and Economics 281-350 (1992);Christine
Augustyniak, Economic Valuation of Services Provided by Natural Resources: Putting a Price on
the Priceless, 45 Baylor L. Rev. 389 (1993);Richard Carson & Peter Nararro, Fundamental Issues
in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 28 Nat. Resources J. 815, 816-17 (1988); Jeffrey C.
Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate
Nonuse Damages, 43 Duke L. Rev. 879 (1994); Carl V. Phillips and Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Contingent Valuation of Damage to Natural Resources: How Accurate? How Appropriate?, 4 Tox.
L. Rep. 520, 528 (1989);Note, "Ask a Silly Question .... ": Contingent Valuation of Natural
Resource Damages 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1981 (1992);
8. The embedding phenomenon in CVM is addressed more fully in a study set out in
Binger, Copple, & Hoffman, supra note 3, §111.
9. For a more comprehensive description of the embedding phenomenon, see infra III;
Binger, Copple, & Hoffman, supra note 3, § II,
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Within the regulatory literature"0 , the "embedding phenomenon"
was first identified by a blue ribbon economics panel assembled by
NOAA," where it was the centerpiece of the Panel's concerns regarding
the reliability and accuracy of CVM in the natural resource damages
context. However, as NOAA began to develop its protocols for the use
of CVM in quantifying natural resource damages associated with oil
spills, the embedding phenomenon was off-handedly dismissed with little
discussion of its relevance to rational choice concerns. 2 Contrary to the
NOAA rulemakers' conclusions, the authors assert in this article that
concerns regarding the effect of the embedding phenomenon on
CVM-based natural resource damages claims have not been adequately
addressed by NOAA and its proposed CVM protocols. Accordingly, the
embedding phenomenon remains as a real and substantial weakness in
CVM assessments of natural resource damages. The following discussion
is presented in two parts. First, the authors describe the regulatory status
of the embedding phenomenon within the development of natural
resource damages regulations governing the use of CVM. Second, the
authors explain why, as a matter of economic choice theory, the
embedding phenomenon casts great doubt on the inherent reliability of
CVM in the natural resources context.
II. EMBEDDING PHENOMENON IN THE REGULATORY
CONTEXT
While NOAA was not the first Federal agency to address the use
of CVM in the natural resource damages assessment process, 3 it was
10. The U.S. Department of Interior ("DOI"), under authority granted to it by CERCLA,
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, pursuant to OPA, are the two
federal agencies most actively involved with the promulgation of natural resource damage
regulations, and accordingly, with the CVM component of the resulting regulatory schemes.
For a comprehensive discussion of the DOI and NOAA rulemaking efforts in the CVM
context, see Binger, et al., supra note 3, at § II.
11. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Extension of Comment Period and Release of Contingent Valuation
Methodology Report, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601 (1993) thereinafter NOAA Report].
12. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
13. DOI has been involved in an extensive series of ongoing rulemakings which, in part,
address and continue to struggle with the use of CVM'to quantify natural resource
damages. In 1986, DOI issued its final rule, Department of Interior, Natural Resource
Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11), which was
challenged and invalidated in part in State of Ohio v. Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d
432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On remand, DOI issued a proposed rule to address the Court's
concerns, relating, in particular to nonuse values and methods for their quantification.
Department of Interior, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752 (1991). After the change of Presidential administrations,
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responsible for the first regulatory identification of the embedding
phenomenon as a potential CVM flaw. In 1993, NOAA's CVM study
panel ("NOAA Panel"), charged with the task of determining whether the
"technique is capable of providing reliable information about lost
existence or other passive-use values," issued a detailed set of findings
and recommendations regarding the application of CVM to natural
resource damage assessments.14
Noting that "[tihe contingent valuation method has been criticized
for many reasons and the Panel believes that a number of these criticisms
are particularly compelling,"'5 the Panel identified the following
concerns as being of particular importance to the Panel's analysis:
16
1. "The contingent valuation method can produce results
,17that appear to be inconsistent with rational choice...,
In explaining the rational choice concerns, the NOAA
Panel noted that CVM study results tend to demonstrate
an inconsistency among the choices made by individuals
in that willingness-to-pay bids do not appear to consis-
tently increase or decrease with corresponding increases
or decreases of the quantity of the good in question. For
example, the NOAA Panel cited one study that demon-
strated that total willingness-to-pay was not significantly
different for scenarios seeking bids to protect 2,000,
20,000 or 200,000 non-endangered migratory birds of the
same species. Under choice theory, there should have
been significant variation between the groups of bids
DOI reopened the comment period on the proposed rule and provided additional discussion
of natural resource damage assessments, with particular emphasis on issues relating to the
use of CVM. Department of Interior, Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Proposed
Rule, Reopening of Comment Period, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,327 (1993). Final regulations were
officially promulgated in 1994. Department of the Interior, Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, Final Rule, 59 Fed.Reg. 14,262 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11). Issues
concerning CVM and the quantification of nonuse values are presently the subject of a
separate DOI rulemaking. Department of the Interior, Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed.Reg. 23,098 (1994).
14. NOAA Report, supra note 11, at 4603.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 4604. It is important to emphasize that the concerns and criticisms outlined
below were specifically identified by the NOAA Panel. As such, those criticisms are set out
here for the purpose of describing the NOAA CVM regulatory history and not as a
definitive statement regarding CVM. The authors' note that the area of CVM criticism is a
wide open field. As such, the authors are presently conducting further CVM research that,
when completed, may provide a different perspective on the concerns identified by the
NOAA Panel.
17. Id.
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based on the different quantities of birds (units) in each
scenario. 8
2. "[Rlesponses to CVM surveys sometimes seem implausi-
bly large in view of the many programs for which
individuals might be asked to contribute and the exis-
tence of both public and private goods that might be
substitutes for the resource(s) in question.. ." '" The
NOAA Panel's concern about the implausibility of CVM
responses essentially focuses on the fact that willing-
ness-to-pay bids for specific environmental goods
generally fail to consider the many other environmental
goods which should, logically, receive similar bids by the
respondents."
3. "[RIelatively few applications of the CVM method have
reminded respondents forcefully of the budget con-
straints under which all must operate . .." 21 The
NOAA Panel noted that, in answering CVM surveys,
respondents "may respond without thinking carefully
about how much disposable income they have available
to allocate to all causes, public and private .... To date,
relatively few CVM surveys have reminded respondents
convincingly of the very real economic restraints within
which spending decisions must be made. "'
4. "[I]t is difficult in CVM surveys to provide adequate
information to respondents about the policy or program
for which values are being elicited and to be sure they
18. As a general rule, the NOAA Panel explained:
"Common notions of rationality impose other requirements which are
relevant in different contexts. Usually, though not always, it is reasonable
to suppose that more of something regarded as good is better so long as
an individual is not satiated. This is in general translated into a willingness
to pay somewhat more for more of a good, as judged by the individual.
Also, if marginal or incremental willingness to pay for additional amounts
does decline with the amount already available, it is usually not reasonable
to assume that it declines very abruptly."
Id. Therefore, in regard to the bird studies, the NOAA Panel observed:
"Diminishing marginal willingness to pay for additional protection could
be expected to result in some drop. But a drop to zero, especially when the
willingness to pay for he first 2,000 birds is certainly not trivial, is hard to
explain as the expression of a consistent, rational set of choices."
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 4604-5.
21. Id. at 4604.
22. Id. at 4605.
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have absorbed and accepted this information as the basis
for their responses . . ." ' The NOAA Panel's concern
regarding information adequacies went both to the
amount of information given respondents prior to
making a CVM bid and to the ability of the respondents
to understand and incorporate that information into their
decision making processes. 2'
5."[Ijn generating aggregate estimates using the CVM
technique, it is sometimes difficult determining the
'extent of the market . . . ," As the Panel opined,
attempts at defining the relevant market for an environ-
mental good may result in under sampling if there exist
respondents outside the relevant geographic area who
may hold some non-use or passive-use value for a given
resource. 26
6. "IRespondents in CVM surveys may actually be ex-
pressing feelings about public spiritedness or the 'warm
glow' of giving, rather than actual willingness-to-pay for
the program in question .... " 2' As such, rather than
being an effort at carefully attempting to ascertain a real
personally held value, a CVM bid may, rather, be more
akin to a charitable donation defined generally by the
respondent's standard limit for such donations, i.e., $10
to $20.1
To a greater or lesser degree, at least some of these CVM flaws
identified by the NOAA Panel are conceptually related to the embedding
phenomenon-the "most important internal argument against the
reliability of the CVM approach .... " The NQAA Panel described the
embedding phenomenon as follows:
23. Id. at 4604.
24. Id. at 4605.
25. Id. at 4604. In reality, however, the definition of the extent of the market creates both
under sampling and over valuation problems. That is, if the market is too broadly defined,
the total assessment will, undoubtedly, pull in monetary bids from respondents whose
relationship with the goods at issue is so attenuated that the validity of their stated value
must be seriously questioned as merely an expression of an environmental attitude or
"warm glow," as opposed to a legitimate and thoughtful valuation.
26. Id. at 4602.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 4605.
29. Id. at 4607.
Summer 1995]
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Different but similar samples of respondents are asked about
their willingness-to-pay for prevention of environmental
damage scenarios that are identical except for their scale:
different numbers of seabirds saved, different numbers of
forest tracts preserved from logging, et cetera. It is reported
that average willingness-to-pay is often substantial for the
smallest scenario presented, but is then substantially indepen-
dent of the size of the damage averted, rising slightly if at all
for large changes in size.'
Thus, the effect of the embedding phenomenon, as identified by the
NOAA Panel, raises serious questions concerning whether it is ever
possible for CVM natural resource damage assessments to estimate, in
any meaningful way, the monetary values respondents actually hold or
attribute to the specific environmental goods.
Nonetheless, in an attempt to, at least in part, address these
concerns, the NOAA Panel proposed a series of CVM guidelines. First,
the NOAA Panel suggested that CVM surveys be conducted in accor-
dance with a set of survey protocols generally applicable to survey
research. 3' Second, the NOAA Panel provided a separate set of guide-
lines tailored to specifically address CVM natural resource damage
surveys.-'
30. Id.
31. The general survey protocols suggested by the NOAA Panel include:
(1) Appropriate selection of the sample type and adequate sample size;
(2) Minimization of non-responses;
(3)Conduct of survey in a personal interview format;
(4)Incorporation of the results of previous studies of CVM results in
order to avoid biasing interviewer effects;
(5)Careful pretesting of the CVM questionnaire; and
(6)Accurate and thorough reporting of the underlying protocols utilized
in the CVM survey and the resulting analysis of the study.
Id. at 4608, 4611-12.
32. The panel's CVM-specific guidelines included:
(1)Conservative survey design to avoid upwards bias and to increase
trustworthiness of results;
(2)The use of the elicitation format asking willingness-to-pay questions
rather than willingness-to-accept questions, which tend to overestimate
values;
(3)The use of a referendum question format that asks respondent to
vote for or against a particular level of taxation directed to the
environmental good;
(4)Providing the respondent with accurate information regarding the
program or policy at issue to allow the respondent to make informed
choices;
(5)Pretesting of any photographs used as part of the survey and
reminding the respondent of the existence of undamaged substitute
[Vol. 35
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Even assuming the implementation of these two sets of guide-
lines, the Panel explained that the guidelines may not be enough to
satisfy concerns about the general accuracy of CVM. Noting that CVM
results are not subject to external validation because there are no other
non-CVM methods which can quantify or capture non-use values, the
Panel observed that "a problem arises because passive-use losses [non-use
values] have few or no overt behavioral consequences. The faintness of
the behavioral trail means that a well designed and adequately sensitive
measuring instrument is needed to substitute for conventional observa-
tions of behavior."' As such, the Panel came back to the ultimate
rhetorical query: "In particular, can the CVM method provide a sufficient-
ly reliable estimate of total loss-including passive-use loss-to play a
useful role in damage assessment?"'
Thus, the Panel opined that CVM-based natural resource damage
assessments should be subject to traditional evidentiary rules with the
offering party bearing the burden of proof.' Further, the NOAA Panel
commodities that might affect the respondent's bids;
(6)Allowing for an adequate time lapse from the accident causing the
environmental damage in order to permit the respondent to better
evaluate the plausibility of restoration;
(7)The use of temporal averaging of responses elicited at different
points in time in order to eliminate the effects of time-based bias;
(8)Provide respondent with a no answer option and ask the respondent
to explain the choice;
(9)Inquiry into attitudes, such as general opinions about the environ-
ment, in order to interpret responses to bid questions; and
(10)Additional checks on the respondent's understanding and accep-
tance of the scenario.
Id. at 4608-09, 4612-13.
33. Id. at 4610.
34. With these reservations, the NOAA Panel concluded that "CV studies can produce
estimates reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial process of damage assessments,
including lost passive-use values." Id. (emphasis supplied). Even then, the NOAA Panel
suggested that while "a well-conducted CV study provides an adequately reliable
benchmark to begin such arguments," the CVM results should be considered "in
combination with other evidence, including the testimony of expert witnesses." Id. at 4611.
35. As the NOAA Panel stated:
Until such time as there is a set of reliable reference surveys, the
burden of proof of reliability must rest on the survey designers. They
must show through pretesting or other experiments that their survey
does not suffer from the problems that these guidelines are intended to
avoid. Specifically, if a CV survey suffered from any of the following
maladies, we would judge its findings unreliable:
A high non-response rate to the entire survey instrument or to the
valuation question.
Inadequate responsiveness to the scope of the environmental insult.
Lack of understanding of the task by the respondents.
Summer 1995]
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cautioned that CVM based evidence could not be relied upon in isolation.
Rather, at most, CVM results required independent verification through
other forms of evidence before such results could be relied upon by a
trier of fact. Accordingly, the Panel suggested "drastic reform of the CV
procedure" prior to full acceptance of the method and its results as the
basis for natural resource damage claims.'
Thus, given the depth of the Panel's concerns regarding CVM's
inherent conceptual flaws, including the embedding phenomenon, the
Panel's overall evaluation of CVM does not even rise to the level of
"damning by faint praise." Further, even with the implementation of its
proposed guidelines, it would be generous to conclude that the Panel was
even guardedly optimistic that the suggested protocols would adequately
address the embedding phenomenon and, accordingly, CVM's tenuous
connection to the tenets of choice theory.
Nonetheless, apparently motivated by a desire to add the CVM
arrow to its assessment quiver, NOAA disregarded the Panel's concerns
and, instead, interpreted the Panel's report as a plan for regulatory action
and CVM rulemaking. In response to the NOAA Panel, the NOAA
rulemakers proposed a set of CVM protocols ostensibly designed to
improve the reliability of CVM valuations and to, presumably, respond
to the NOAA Panel's concerns regarding the embedding phenomenon.'
In this effort to establish CVM protocols, NOAA emphasized three
components of CVM studies: 1) Survey instrument design and develop-
ment; 2) Survey administration; and 3) The analysis of the nature of the
results.' Within those categories, NOAA suggested requirements for
CVM assessments that, at a superficial level, might appear to counter the
embedding phenomenon.
As to the survey design and development component, NOAA
proposed, among others, the following protocols. First, NOAA recognized
the importance of providing respondents with adequate information to
make CVM bids. As such, NOAA assumed that, within the context of a
brief survey contact, it is possible to provide respondents with adequate
information to quickly solve problems that may stymie environmental
regulators, lawyers, and scientists for years. As a further check on the
Lack of belief in the full restoration scenario.
"Yes" or "no" votes on the hypothetical referendum that are not
followed up or explained by making reference to the cost and/or the
value of the program.
Id. at 4609.
36. Id. at 4609
37. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 1062 (1994) (proposed for
codification at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990) [hereinafter NOAA Proposed Regulations].
38. Id. at 1143.
[Vol. 35
CONTINGENT VALUATION METHODOLOGY
survey development process, the public trustee is required to determine,
presumably through pre-testing of survey instruments, whether "respon-
dents understood and found credible the description of the injuries...
and the program for preventing injuries or restoring the natural resource"
set out in the survey."
Second, in order to ensure that CVM survey respondents
maintain a rational financial context for their WTP bids, the NOAA
Proposed Regulations require that respondents be reminded, both before
and after the elicitation of their WTP bid, that "their WTP for the
environmental program in question would reduce their expenditures on
other goods."' As NOAA explained: "The goal is to induce respondents
to keep in mind other likely expenditures, including those on other
environmental goods, when evaluating the main scenario."4 Likewise,
where appropriate, it was the NOAA Panel's opinion that survey
respondents should be reminded of "related natural resources that have
not been injured by a discharge if such resources exist . . . ,2 in order
to allow respondents to adjust their bids based on the existence of such
substitute resources.
As to the survey administration components, although not
actually requiring a particular mode of administering a CVM survey,
after extensive discussion of the three primary modes of survey adminis-
tration-in-person, mail, and telephone-NOAA strongly suggested that
CVM surveys be conducted through in-person interviews.' As NOAA
explained its preference for in-person interviews:
A CVM survey designed for natural resource damage assess-
ment purposes is likely to impart a large amount of informa-
tion to respondents causing interviews to be lengthy and often
complex. In-person interviews offer the opportunity to
motivate the respondents and to hold their interest by provid-
ing important information in a graphical and pictorial format
and asking interactive questions regarding the respondent's
understanding and acceptance of key features of the instru-
ment. It also permits the interviewers to record verbatim
responses to important open-ended questions. Such informa-
39. NOAA Proposed Regulation, supra note 37 at 1083, (proposed for codification at 15
C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(5)(B)).
40. Id. at 1183 (proposed for codification at 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(5)(i)(C)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1158. See id. at 1184, (proposed for codification at15 C.F.R. § 990.79(c)) (requiring
consideration of substitute alternative resources and/or services when calculating
compensable values).
43. Id. at 1183,(proposed for codification at 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(5)(ii)(B)); (stating no
preference for mode); id. at 1144 (stating preference for in-person interviews).
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tion may be critical in demonstrating that the trustee(s) has
adhered to the regulatory standards proposed by NOAA.'
NOAA also proposed several methods to analyze the nature of
CVM surveys results in order to assess their validity and reliability. These
methods, which ostensibly bear upon the embedding phenomenon,
include sensitivity testing through the use of parallel surveys and the
calibration discounting of CVM results to produce a more conservative
damage figure to account for CVM's inherent biases.
In order to counter the NOAA Panel's concern that CVM bids
represent a pro-environmental vote as opposed to an actual valuation of
the specific commodity at issue, the NOAA Proposed Regulations set
forth an internal validation system-as opposed to external valida-
tion-for CVM surveys which requires the public trustee to conduct two
separate validation surveys in which the dimensions of the injury at issue
are either scaled up or scaled down from the level of the actual injury at
issue. The results of the validation surveys are then to be compared to
the results of the primary survey to determine if the responses validation
surveys and the primary survey demonstrate sufficient sensitivity to the
differences in the scope of the injuries.4 NOAA explained that, "the
scenarios may vary along any of the margins of intensity, geography, and
duration of damage, and for prevention scenarios, the probability of an
event occurring."
In addition, to counter the numerous potential biases identified
by the NOAA Panel, NOAA proposed a crude method by which to
discount CVM valuations. To meet the biases of concern and in further-
ance of NOAA's general CVM policy encouraging conservative proce-
dures, the proposed regulations require that CVM results be discount-
44. Id. at 1144. Regardless of which mode is selected, NOAA requires that the survey shall
be administered by an experienced survey research organization. Id. at 1183 (proposed for
codification at 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(5)(ii)(B)(3)).
45. See NOAA Reportnotes 27-28 and accompanying text.
46. NOAA Proposed Regulations, supra note 27, at 1183, (proposed 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(5)(-
iii)); id. at 1145-46. In designing the alternative scenarios, the public trustee must avoid
scenario differences that are so large that variations in results would be a "foregone
conclusion." As such, "[pirior to performance of the test, the trustee(s) shall demonstrate that
not more than ninety-five percent of respondents in a pre-test or in focus groups indicate
that there are meaningful value differences between the scenarios to be tested in any
pair-wise comparison."Id. at 1183, (proposed for codification at 15 C.F.R. § 990.78(b)(-
5)(iii)(c)); Id. at 1146.
47. Id. at 1183, (proposed for codification at 15 C.F.R.§ 990.78(b)(5)(iii)(B)).
48. Id. at 1146.47. In addition to calibration and discounting, NOAA suggested that other
conservative measures be employed, such as requiring lump sum versus installment
payments for WTP bids and avoiding the use of shocking photographs, such as of dead sea
otters, which might tend to inflate or prejudice results. Id.
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ed by 50 percent in order to account for these biases, unless the trustee
can demonstrate why a different calibration factor is appropriate for
given CVM study.'
Interestingly, despite the significant efforts demonstrated by
NOAA in its formulation and explanation of its proposed CVM protocols,
nowhere in NOAA's preamble discussion is there any reference to the
embedding phenomenon or how the proposed protocols might serve to
counteract the phenomenon. Instead, the only reference to embedding is
in NOAA's response to comments where the agency simply stated that
"NOAA agrees with the commentators who believe that alleged biases in
CVM responses resulting from the embedding phenomenon can be
avoided through careful questionnaire design and execution of the
survey.''se However, as discussed in the next section, the authors assert
that the proposed NOAA protocols do not adequately address the
embedding phenomenon, and that embedding continues to present a very
real and substantial flaw in CVM studies and in the accuracy of any
damage claims derived from such studies.
III. THE EMBEDDING PHENOMENON IN THE ECONOMIC
CONTEXT
Despite the elaborate procedures proposed by NOAA, the issue
of embedding remains a potential problem in evaluating CVM results.
Consider the following survey results, reported in Binger, Copple, and
Hoffman.- A survey satisfying most of the proposed NOAA proto-
cols' was designed to elicit, from residents of the Rocky Mountain
states, willingness-to-pay to avoid a 1 percent timber harvest in the
Selway Bitterroot Wilderness Area of Idaho. Respondents were asked to
express their WTP to prevent the timber harvest in four different surveys.
49. Id. at 1183 (proposed for codificaton at 15 C.F.R.§ 990.78(b)(5)(i)(D)(4)). Curiously, the
NOAA Proposed Regulations, supra note 37, refer to this discounting process as "calibration."
Traditionally, in the context of any technical modelling process, "calibration" refers to the
adjustment or fine-tuning of a model to ensure internal consistency. "Validation" is the
process by which model results are compared with real data to ensure external consistency.
The NOAA discounting requirement is neither, but instead a crude method to, in some sort
of wholesale way, attempt to mitigate the inherent biases and inaccuracies presented by
CVM valuations. As such, the 50% discount "calibration" requirement is virtually on
admission by NOAA of the inadequacy of CVM as a natural resource damage assessment
tool.
50. Id. at 1160.
51. Binger, Copple, & Hoffman, supra note 3, § I1.
52. Despite the fact that the embedding study was conducted prior to the publication of
the proposed NOAA protocols, the study satisfied all of the relevant protocols with the
exception that telephone interviews, rather than in-person interviews, were employed.
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The variations in the four surveys that are crucial to this analysis of CVM
reliability and accuracy can be summarized as:
Survey A: Respondents were asked how much their households
were willing to pay toJprevent a timber harvest in the Selway
Bitterroot Wilderness.
Survey B: Respondents were asked how much they as individ-
uals were willing to pay to prevent a timber harvest in the
Selway Bitterroot Wilderness.'
Survey C: Respondents were first given the information that
there are fifty-seven wilderness areas in the states of Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, and then asked how much
their households were willing to pay to prevent a timber
harvest in just the Selway Bitterroot wilderness. After respond-
ing to the first question, they were asked how much more they
were willing to pay to prevent the harvest in the other fifty-six
wilderness areas.9
Survey D: Respondents were first asked how much their
households were willing to pay to prevent a timber harvest in
all fifty-seven wilderness areas. After responding to the first
question, they were asked how much of that amount they
would like to see designated specifically to prevent the timber
harvest in the Selway Bitterroot Wilderness. 6
Surveys A and B address the question of whether respondents
distinguish between individual ( person) and household (several people)
WTP. Surveys A and C address the question of whether WTP changes
when respondents are reminded of other possible environmental goods
that might compete for their contributions. Surveys A and D address the
classic embedding problem. 7
53. Brian Binger & Elizabeth Hoffman, Selway Bitterroot Wilderness Study Survey A
(1991) (on file with authors Binger and Hoffman) [hereinafter Survey A).
54. Brian Binger & Elizabeth Hoffman, Selway Bitterroot Wilderness Study Survey B
(1991) (on file with authors Binger and Hoffman) [hereinafter Survey B].
55. Brian Binger & Elizabeth Hoffman, Selway Bitterroot Wilderness Study Survey C
(1991) (on file with authors Binger and Hoffman) [hereinafter Survey Cl.
56. Brian Binger & Elizabeth Hoffman, Selway Bitterroot Wilderness Study Survey D
(1991) (on file with authors Binger and Hoffman) [hereinafter Survey D].
57. It is not clear that it is possible to ever know fully the sources of the embedding
phenomenon. However, one potential source comes from the "warm glow" associated with
a real or hypothetical indicated willingness to pay for almost any "good cause," as identified
by the NOAA Panel. See NOAA Report, supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Suppose,
for example, an individual were to routinely respond with $10 or $20 to a request for a
contribution to anything which sounds like it is remotely worthwhile. This would quite
readily generate the embedding result: The first category of "cause" presented to a
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The results illustrate fundamental inconsistencies inherent in
CVM methodology. Responses to surveys A and B are not significantly
different from one another, suggesting that respondents do not distin-
guish between individual and household WTP, even though WTP of
more than one person should, in principle, be larger than individual
WTP. Responses to surveys A and C are also not significantly different,
suggesting that respondents' bids are not affected by reminding them of
substitute commodities. However, the differences in the responses to
surveys A and D are significant. In survey A, where respondents are
asked only for their WTP for the individual site, the median response is
$10. In survey D, when respondents are first asked for their WTP for all
57 sites and then asked to designate an amount for the individual site,
the median falls to $2. This is a classic example of the problem of
embedding.
Additionally, the variation in results from these surveys would
leave a trustee with a significant question regarding which, if any, of the
WTP values for preventing a 1 percent timber harvest in the Selway
Bitterroot Wilderness area to adopt. Should it be a median individual
WTP of $10 from Surveys A or C; a median household WTP of $5,
divided by mean household size to estimate an individual WTP of
between $1 and $2 from Survey B; or a median individual WTP of $2
from Survey D? If the population of over 5 million in the Rocky
Mountains is deemed applicable, this implies damage estimates ranging
from around $5 million to over $50 million. Yet, there is no guidance in
either the NOAA protocols or the CVM literature regarding which
estimate is acceptable. Moreover, there is no apparent scientific evidence
to support one estimate over another.
This is a striking example of the continued existence of the
embedding problem, even when care is taken to adhere to the recom-
mended procedures. While we recognize that some CVM studies which
follow NOAA protocols might yield a set of internally consistent
respondent receives the routine response. If that is also the final category, then the entire
amount is allocated to it. However, if the first category is subdivided and the respondent
is asked to allocate the first amount among the subcategories, then the likelihood is that the
amount allocated to the target category will be substantially smaller than when inquired
about individually. Obviously, the more levels of subdivision which occur, the smaller will
be the resulting final WTP estimate. This discussion clearly suggests that if responses are
even partly generated according to the above scenario, the results cannot be thought of as
"well-considered" calculations. As an alternative hypothesis related to the warm glow effect,
though somewhat less generous in human terms, it is possible that, when posed with a
CVM survey, respondents provide a standard or "pat" bid, not out of a sense of charity or
duty, but, instead, to placate the interviewer and bring the interview to a quick and painless
end. Of course, however, further research is required to determine the existence of, what we
shall call, the "get out of my face' or "interview avoidance" effect.
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estimates, we do not share NOAA's faith that following those protocols
will generally demonstrate such internal consistency. Moreover, the
search for such consistency essentially constitutes a one-tailed test: when
inconsistencies such as those in the survey discussed above are present,
there is clearly a problem in interpreting the results; but even if following
the protocols does not result in inconsistencies, there is still no reason to
believe that the indicated result should be relied upon as being correct;
that is, as externally valid.
The fundamental problem with the NOAA protocols is that they
suggest that adhering to them lends scientific credibility to the resulting
CVM estimates. Yet, there is virtually no external validity attached to that
claim. First, the 50 percent discounting rule is apparently based on one
study' that has never been replicated either using the same or different
conditions. As a general rule, scientists do not accept test results as
conclusive evidence without many replications by independent research-
ers. Moreover, a study of hypothetical and real WTP for environmentally
friendly electricity found a 8- to 10-fold difference between hypothetical
and real WTI". This one other study suggests, at a minimum, that the
50 percent rule should not apply to all environmental commodities. And,
since each commodity is unique, how is the trustee to decide which study
to adopt as a guide?
IV. CONCLUSION
What is particularly interesting about the regulatory treatment of
CVM is that it represents an agency application of the old entrepreneurial
principle: "If you can't fix it, get a bigger hammer" or, any problem can
be solved if you dedicate enough effort to it. Although this article is not
intended to be the ultimate criticism of CVM, the authors assert that
CVM may likely prove to simply be too flawed to serve as a basis for
natural resource damage claims. That is, despite NOAA's marked
enthusiasm for working CVM into the natural resource damage assess-
ment process (in contrast to the NOAA Panel's lukewarm evaluation of
CVM), the fundamental problems presented by CVM may simply prove
to be unfixable. At the very least, CVM is still largely in an embryonic
state of development. Thus, CVM should not be forced into regulatory
service until the method is fully developed and, more importantly, until
we better understand how, whether at all, CVM is actually linked to the
real values that citizens place on environmental goods. Therefore, at least
58. Donald L. Coursey et al., On the Disparity Between Willingness to Accept and Willingness
to Pay Measures of Value, 102 Q.J. Econ. 679 (1987).
59. Brian Byrnes et al., Talk is Cheap: Electric Customer Willingness to Pay for Environmental
Commodities (forthcoming).
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at this stage of CVM research, natural resource damage defendants
should not be subjected to damage claims based on such an undeveloped
method with all of its underlying uncertainties.
At best, the NOAA protocols represent a stop gap attempt at a
somewhat superficial level to address some of the concerns regarding
CVM reliability. There is, however, a fundamental question which NOAA
has not yet answered concerning whether the problems presented by
CVM (indeed, NOAA has not even adequately identified those problems)
can be fixed or are so deeply ingrained in the method that CVM, at least
in the natural resource damages context, is fatally flawed. As such, there
is serious doubt whether the NOAA protocols concerning either
sensitivity testing or calibration address these inherent flaws. For
example, as to the "calibration" or "discounting" of survey results, there
is a question whether such flaws can be remedied by mandating
reduction of survey-derived valuations by some seemingly arbitrary
factor. It is a long-standing and well accepted principle that 50 percent of
nonsense is still nonsense. Similarly, as to NOAA's protocols for
sensitivity testing, such testing can only be meaningful for designing and
fine-tuning survey instruments based on a reliable method. As such,
sensitivity testing is meaningless without this underlying reliability.
Likewise, the same concerns about inherent CVM flaws applies to the
general social science survey protocols proposed by NOAA. The
application of such procedures can only enhance the accuracy of survey
results based on otherwise accurate economic or social science methods.
In all, discounting, sensitivity testing, and survey procedures applied at
the end of the CVM process cannot cure or compensate for methodologi-
cal flaws that are inherent in the basic foundation of CVM.
As demonstrated by the authors' research concerning the
embedding phenomenon, CVM cannot reasonably be characterized as an
accepted, reliable, or trustworthy method. Instead, the embedding
phenomenon demonstrates that CVM is too inherently flawed to use as
a valuation technique in natural resource damage actions. Further, there
is no reason to conclude that the embedding phenomenon is the only
serious flaw presented by CVM. On the contrary, along with the fact that
it is impossible to externally validate CVM results, it is more likely than
not that other serious flaws are inextricable or unfixable aspects of the
method. As such, federal and state agencies should, as a function of their
duty to the public interest, tread carefully when reviewing and endorsing
natural resource damage valuation methods. Accordingly, NOAA and
DOT should recognize CVM for what it is and to refuse to sponsor its
application.
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